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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

EDGED IN STONE, INC.,

Case No. CV-2010-4923-0C

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Docket No. 40463-2012

v.
NORTHWEST POWER SYSTEMS, LLC,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
CATERPILLAR, INC. and PERKINS
ENGINES, INC.,
Defendants.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock

Honorable Mitchell Brown, District Judge

Aaron N. Thompson (ISB#: 4389)
Bryan N. Henrie (ISB#: 8530)
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Fax: (208) 234-2961
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

Reed W. Larsen
COOPER AND LARSEN, CHTD.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Fax: (208) 235-1182
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I.
A.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

ARGUMENT
APPLIES TO DEFEAT THE DEFENSE

ASSERTED BY NORTHWEST
1.

The Agreement between Northwest and Edged was a Service Agreement,
Yet Northwest Asserts a Goods Component, Making the Statute of Frauds
Applicable.

Northwest seems to misinterpret Edged's argument regarding the Statute of
Frauds and the scope of the contract pled by Edged in this action. As Northwest points
out, Edged admitted and pled that the contract in question (the one breached) was one for
service-inspection of the Skid engine. In its Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial, Edged pled as follows:

66.
A contract existed between Edged and Defendant
Northwest Power ... with terms both express and implied,
regarding the diagnosis and potential warranty repair and
service of the Skid.
67.
Defendants breached their contract, both express
and implied, with Edged through their failure to obtain
Edged's permission or request for an engine replacement in
the Skid prior to replacing the Skid's engine, resulting in a
substantial service bill to Edged.
68.
As a result of Defendants' breach of contract,
Edged was unable to pay the bill for the engine replacement
and has suffered significant damages in an amount to be
proven hereafter at a trial of the issue.
(R at 46).

Edged clearly pled a breach of a service contract. Northwest asserts that Edged
"put forth no evidence in the record disputing that Northwest fulfilled the agreement" and
that "[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact disputing that Mr. Adams determined
what was wrong with the engine." Resp't. Br. at 22. As is evident from the underlying
complaint in the matter, Edged did not plead that Northwest breached the contract by its
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failure to "determine what was wrong with the engine" but rather through Northwest's
going beyond the scope of the contract, failing to obtain Edged's permission "for an
engine replacement in the Skid." Thus, notwithstanding Northwest's assertions that there
is no dispute regarding a portion of the contract, there is certainly a dispute, with an
evidentiary basis, regarding Northwest's breach of contract in going beyond the scope of
the Parties' agreement to Edged's detriment.
Responding to Edged's contract claim, Northwest raised the defense that Edged,
through its employee, Webb, contracted to have the Skid engine replaced. In interposing
this defense, Northwest itself has made the UCC Statute of Frauds applicable, as this
defense involves the assertion of a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or
more. In this case, the engine they claim Edged contracted to purchase from Northwest
was billed to Edged at a price of $3,000 in a total bill of $4,385.18. (R at 104).
The Statute of Frauds, as applied in Idaho, provides the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale
has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker.
IDAHO CODE § 28-2-201(1) (emphasis added).
Given the sale price for the engine of more than $500, Northwest is not entitled to
present the contract by way of defense unless there is "some writing to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker." IDAHO CODE § 28-2201(1) (emphasis added).
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So, even though the Statute of Frauds does not apply to the underlying (and
admitted) contract of service for "diagnosis and potential warranty repair and service of
the Skid," it certainly applies to bar evidence of any alleged contract for sale of the Skid
engine, absent a writing to indicate the contract was made and signed by Edged.

2.

There is no Bar through Equitable Estoppel.

Equitable estoppel does not apply here. Northwest asserts that equitable estoppel
applies "where an agreement is complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or
contains provisions that are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Resp't.

Br. at 27. Northwest further asserts that Northwest should be protected against being
defrauded by Edged, declaring that "a party who is induced to rely on an oral agreement
and who changes position to his own detriment cannot be defrauded by [one] who
interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare the agreement invalid." Resp't. Br. at 27, citing
Mikesell v. Newworld Dev. Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 874, 840 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Cl. App.
1992).
Simply stated, Edged has not interposed the Statute of Frauds to declare its
agreement with Northwest invalid, thus equitable estoppel does not apply. Edged has
made it very clear that the agreement for services, including diagnosis of the Skid engine,
was fulfilled but that Northwest breached the contract by going beyond its terms to install
a new engine to Edged's detriment. Edged is not attempting to declare the agreement
invalid. Edged is only using the Statute of Frauds to prevent Northwest from fabrication
of additional material terms, including the sale from Northwest to Edged of a $3,000 Skid
engme.
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B.

WEBB HAD NO APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND EDGED
Edged would again emphasize that, even if the evidence were to point to apparent

authority in this case, this Court has held that the "existence or lack of authority of an
agent is a question of fact." Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 465,
468 (1975), citing Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10 (1972). Specifically, this Court has held
that "whether or not there is apparent authority on the agent's part to act as he acted-it is
a question for the trier of fact to resolve from the evidence." Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho
495,498 (1985), citing Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho at 12; John Scowcroft & Sons Co. v.
Roselle, 77 Idaho 142, 146 (1955); Thornton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 108 (1953)
(emphasis in the original). Where there is any reasonable factual dispute as to whether an
agent, such as Webb, has apparent authority, a ruling as a matter of law is improper, as
the trier of fact (the jury) is to resolve this dispute. There is such a reasonable factual
dispute here, as explained in Appellant's Brief.
Specifically regarding the case law cited by Northwest in support of its position
on apparent authority, Idaho Title Company v. American States Insurance Company
repeats the law that "apparent authority of an agent cannot be created by the acts or
statements of the agent alone," while specifically finding that "American States had the
duty of using reasonable diligence to ascertain if Idaho Title and its employee Turner had
authority to request cancellation." 96 Idaho 465, 468 (1975). In the instant case,
Northwest very candidly admits, when asked if Webb ever indicated that he had authority
to deal with Northwest directly in making these decisions, that Adams "had no way of
knowing if that was true or not" and that he had done nothing in terms of "reasonable
diligence" beyond assuming "he was dealing with a standup company." (Dep. of Mark
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Adams at 25, 11. 17-24, taken 512312012, augmented 3/15/2013). This cannot be found to
be "reasonable diligence." Even if the District Court believed this to be "reasonable
diligence," this is a question for the trier of fact, the jury.
Killinger v. lest stands, in part, for the proposition that the "declarations of an
alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to prove the grant of power exercised by
him and to bind his principal to third parties," further finding that "[t]he statements by the
alleged agent, as to the scope of his authority, are admissible if, at the time the statements
are offered in evidence, the existence of the agency has been proven by independent
evidence." 91 Idaho 571, 575 (1967). Here, Northwest has built its case almost
exclusively on the "statements [of] the alleged agent," Webb, before any independent
evidence showing the existence of the agency have been proven. Northwest's case for
Webb receiving the bid, transmitting it to Preston (Edged) and indicating to Northwest
that Edged accepted the bid and wished to have the engine replaced are based exclusively
on testimony from Webb without any independent evidence. However, even where there
are "other corroborative facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence, agency then
becomes a fact question for the jury." Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415,430 (1952). Thus,
even were Webb's statements somehow corroborated, the grant of summary judgment
and taking this determination away from the jury is improper.

C.

THERE

ARE

FACTUAL

DISPUTES

WHERE

NORTHWEST

REPRESENTS THERE ARE NONE
Edged disputes that it authorized Adams to replace the engine. First, Webb was
not authorized to deal with Northwest. (R at 152, 172, pp. 115, 194, 11. 17-22, 13-15).
Second, Edged did not want Northwest to replace the engine. (R at 43, <]I 32; R at 157, pp.
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132, 133, 11. 20-25, 1-15). If Northwest and Adams had infonned Edged of the nonwarranty nature of the engine replacement, Edged would have had the engine rebuilt by
its in-house mechanic at a substantial savings. [d.
In addition, Northwest states more than once that both Webb and Adams testified

that Webb informed Preston of the dusting, that it was not covered under warranty and it
needed to be replaced, but this is unsubstantiated by Adams's deposition testimony other
than through hearsay statements regarding prior statements made by Webb. (R at 505, p.
26,11. 7-11).
To respond to some representations made by Northwest that are not accurate,
Northwest represents that "[t]here was no daily maintenance of the Skid." Resp't. Br. at

22. However, there was in fact daily maintenance of the Skid, or at least such is in
contention. (R at 147-148, 200, pp. 93,95, 98, 11. 19-20, 17-23, 8-17). This fact does
little to resolve the legal dispute before the Court, but Appellant desired to clear the air on
this issue.
Furthermore, Northwest makes it appear, through its briefing, that it was willing
to release the Skid to Edged and that Edged simply failed to get the Skid. Resp't. Br. at 9.
This account of the facts leaves out the important detail that, once Northwest took out the
replaced engine and told Edged to come get the Skid, Northwest insisted on payment for
its labor in replacing and removing the engine before the Skid would be released. (Dep.
of Mark Adams at 44, 45, 11. 18-25, 1, taken 5/23/2012, augmented 3/15/2013). Due to

Edged's inability to pay the bill, Edged was unable to pick up the Skid. (R at 43, <]I 37).
Northwest states in its briefing that "Mr. George admitted he knew there was no
warranty from Northwest on the engine," and goes on to hammer this point home. Resp't.
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Br. at 7. This argument is out of place in Northwest's briefing because the issue of breach
of warranty was voluntarily dismissed, has not been appealed and is no longer at issue.
To address Northwest's concerns regarding Mr. Adam's deposition being
"augmented," Edged does not suggest that his deposition testimony was augmented or
changed, but rather is following proper procedure in indicating to this Court the date on
which the deposition of Mr. Adams was augmented into the record on appeal-the 15 th
day of March, 2013. This is regular practice and is in no way intended to cast aspersions
on Northwest's practices or Mr. Adams's testimony in those particular instances.
Finally, Northwest responds to Edged's statements regarding Edged's potential
lawsuit against Mr. Webb by stating that this position is "unfounded." Resp't. Br. at 21.
Through reference to a potential lawsuit, Edged wishes to show that Mr. Webb has a
personal interest in testifying in a manner consistent with his actual testimony. A quick
look at Idaho Supreme Court precedent shows that Mr. Webb is at least in danger of a
potential lawsuit from Northwest itself. In Killinger v. lest, the Court reasoned that a
"party entering into a contract in his self-assured capacity as agent, with no actual
authority from the purported principal, or in excess of an existing authority, is personally
liable to the other contracting party who acted in good faith and in reliance on the false
representation." 91 Idaho 571, 576 (1967). Mr. Webb had every incentive to color and
shade his testimony to shield himself from liability, so Edged's position regarding a
"potential lawsuit" is not wholly "unfounded."

II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the record and pleadings filed in this case, Appellant has met its
minimal burden of producing facts that demonstrate material disputes of fact as to each
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challenged element of his claims. As such, the District Court's decision is in error, and
must be reversed so that the issue of apparent authority make be determined by the trier
of fact-the jury Edged has demanded.
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was
served on the following named persons at the addresses shown an in the matter indicated.
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER AND LARSEN, CHTD.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[xl U.S. Mail

[ 1Hand Delivery
[ 1Facsimile (208-235-1182)

DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013.

MA ~-C&'THOMPSON, CHTD.
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